When senior defense voices gathered in Whitehall last month, their assessment was blunt: the United Kingdom and its allies are not ready for a major war scenario that could unfold in the coming years. The meeting, organized by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), brought together serving and retired military leaders, NATO-linked officials, policy researchers, and industry advisers. Their concern was not rooted in advocacy for conflict, but in intelligence analysis. The prevailing view in the room reflected a widely held security assessment that Russia is expanding its military planning and leaving open the possibility of a direct confrontation with Europe.
Participants emphasized that deterrence depends on capability. In their view, preventing war requires ensuring that Europe would hold the advantage should a conflict be triggered.
Defense funding has emerged as a recurring focus. Analysts say that European security systems have faced persistent underinvestment for years, leaving critical gaps in equipment, personnel reserves, and infrastructure resilience. But experts argue that financial input alone is not enough—public alignment and national mindset must shift too.
Professor Sam Greene, who studies democratic resilience and Russian politics, said the hesitation lies with governments, not citizens.
“There are signs societies are open to the discussion,” Greene said. “But political leaders still seem unsure about speaking to the public with enough clarity or urgency.”
Greene and other experts also highlighted that the threat is no longer only theoretical. Many security organizations believe Russia is already applying hybrid pressure on Western countries through disinformation, political disruption, infrastructure interference, and strategic intimidation. Moscow has denied involvement in all such allegations, but independent monitors continue to trace repeated incidents—including airspace incursions, GPS disruptions, and infrastructure sabotage—back to Russian security networks, according to open assessments from conflict analysts.
“I think people are increasingly uneasy as these incidents become more visible,” Greene said. “The presence of drones near airports, airspace violations, and other unpredictable security events have created a broader public awareness that risk is rising, even if political labels for it are not being used openly.”
Baltic States Prepare, but Implementation Falls Short
NATO leaders have also voiced caution. The alliance’s secretary general warned earlier this year that Russia could be positioned to consider military action toward NATO borders before 2030. German intelligence-linked officials have echoed similar warnings, saying Moscow continues to keep military confrontation as a possible path, even if not the preferred one.
The Baltic region has taken the risk most seriously. Several countries bordering Russia have expanded civilian defense systems, reintroduced conscription, or launched voluntary national reserve training programs in recent years. Northern European states have also distributed public emergency preparedness guides, signaling a long-term “total defense” model where civilians, businesses, and public institutions could be mobilized rapidly if conflict returns.
Yet experts inside RUSI said the current pace of preparation remains disconnected from the timeline of concern.
“There is a plan with figures and projections,” said Jack Watling, a senior RUSI analyst. “But implementation is lagging. Too much of Europe’s defense conversation is still built around future assumptions, not present capacity.”
Europe’s Peace Era Ends With Hard Trade-Offs
For decades, Europe operated under what analysts now call a “peace surplus”—a long period without major interstate conflict, allowing governments to allocate spending toward welfare systems rather than military infrastructure. That stability fostered economic comfort, with Europe relying on U.S. defense strength as a security anchor.
That balance was disrupted twice: first by a U.S. president who signaled that NATO could no longer depend so heavily on American military intervention, and second by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The shift pushed most European NATO members to increase defense spending rapidly, with nearly all members now meeting the 2% of GDP defense investment benchmark—up from just six countries before the Ukraine invasion began.
Still, analysts question whether the alliance’s new 5% defense target for 2035 is realistic, given economic constraints and political reluctance to ask for civic participation at scale.
Public Concern Grows, Political Will Wavers
Recent EU public sentiment tracking showed strong concern about Europe’s defense outlook, with most respondents supporting security investment as a long-term spending priority. But last month, a senior European military leader sparked backlash after urging citizens to emotionally brace for the consequences of war if it returns, reflecting the divide that persists between public awareness and political appetite to request national sacrifice.
According to experts at Chatham House, civic willingness to contribute depends on trust. Countries with stronger institutional confidence, particularly in Northern Europe, appear more socially aligned with defense readiness models than countries where institutional skepticism remains higher.
“The question now,” analysts say, “is not whether people understand the threat—but whether governments will move faster than the clock of risk.”