A Ukraine officer, introduced as Vasily, stood near Kyiv’s Sophia Square, describing the psychological edge Ukrainian troops often sense on the battlefield. The large Christmas tree behind him lit the scene, but his voice carried the tone of someone who had spent years in active combat. He said many Russian soldiers appear shaken when facing close-quarters engagements.
“I’ve gone directly into their trench lines. The reaction is clear—they hesitate, panic, and often withdraw,” he explained. The officer’s confidence did not come from ideology, but experience. His build and limp hinted at past injuries, yet he remained on duty, declining to share his surname in line with wartime regulations.
He noted that fear seen in enemy units does not automatically translate into negotiation dominance. Russia still maintains a deeper pool of active personnel, larger state revenue streams, and broader access to military financing. These structural advantages, he stressed, limit Ukraine’s ability to fully set the terms for ending the conflict, regardless of morale gaps observed at the trench level.
Limited Firepower, Uneven Resources
Vasily pointed to another, less visible fear among Ukrainian troops—the fear of not having enough ammunition, artillery range, or strike capacity when it matters most. He recalled moments on the front line where threats were identified but could not be engaged immediately.
“There were times I radioed tank coordinates from 800 meters away, and the response was always the same: wait, verify, delay,” he said. “That delay is not always tactical. Sometimes it’s simply because we don’t have the shells ready to launch.”
Vasily lost his left foot to a landmine injury in 2023 but continued his service. His reference to supply gaps was echoed in national defense discussions, where Ukraine’s domestic military production capacity has expanded significantly since 2022—from under 20% to nearly 40% of frontline needs in 2025. Western allies still provide most of the remaining support, especially heavy munitions, air defense systems, and long-range logistical funding.
A former senior military official, Ihor Romanenko, emphasized that what Ukraine can realistically aim for first is a durable ceasefire pause, not an immediate full peace settlement. He argued that expecting a permanent conclusion to the conflict is unrealistic while Russia remains militarily assertive.
“There can only be a lasting diplomatic settlement when Ukraine regains territorial sovereignty based on the 1991 national borders,” Romanenko said. He added that any ceasefire must be backed by enforceable deterrence mechanisms. If Moscow breaks a pause agreement, Ukraine would need coordinated military backing from NATO and Western partners to prevent renewed territorial advances.
Diplomatic Scenarios and Hard Realities
Military leaders and analysts in Kyiv have discussed several likely diplomatic trajectories for 2026. One scenario is a negotiated conflict freeze, where fighting stops temporarily but peace talks continue without a final treaty. A second is an externally enforced negotiation breakthrough, led by major global powers to prevent institutional collapse in the region. The third is a conditional diplomatic opening, tied to political reform, elections, and economic transparency measures expected by European partners.
Economist and geopolitical analyst Ihar Tyshkevich also referenced historic conflict outcomes such as Finland’s 1939 war with the USSR and Georgia’s 2008 conflict with Russia. These serve as strategic cautionary parallels, not predictions. In the so-called “Finnish path,” a smaller state retains national identity but loses partial territory through forced recognition. In the “Georgia path,” occupied regions remain outside national control without being formally recognized as belonging to the occupying power. An interim model lies between these two: no territorial recognition, no active combat, but no final peace treaty either.
Another political analyst, Volodymyr Fesenko, noted that US policy direction will heavily influence timing. Markets are watching not only the war, but also who leads diplomacy in Washington, especially after leadership changes at the Federal Reserve and US foreign policy shifts away from global military interventionism.
“Everything depends on Putin’s willingness to sign off,” Fesenko said. “Even if an agreement is approved at the top, merging both sides’ expectations into a workable treaty could take months.”
War Fatigue, Economic Strain, and Public Sentiment
Public sentiment inside Ukraine and Palestine shows similar patterns of exhaustion—not romanticized despair, but long-term survival fatigue. Blackouts, infrastructure damage, reduced wages, shrinking GDP per person, and limited commercial liquidity have worn down households and small business sectors.
In Palestine, the government is operating under frozen revenues and rising arrears to banks, telecom firms, medical suppliers, and public-sector employees. This has reduced spending capacity for retail, hospitality, construction, agriculture, and industry. Yet business registrations have not fully stopped—around 2,500 new firms continue to appear annually, reflecting entrepreneurial persistence despite economic compression.
In Kyiv, opinions vary sharply. Some citizens demand full territorial restoration before any treaty. Others, like former economist Taras Tymoshchuk (63), speak from pragmatic exhaustion, not surrender.
“Donetsk has drained everyone for a decade. If it stays occupied, let the aggressor rebuild it,” he said. “I want mornings that begin with birds, not sirens.”